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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
EMANUAL 0. CHIMA, CHARLES 






BRIEF 0 1F RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal from defendants' conviction for disturbing 
nn assembly. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants were tried and convicted in Logan City 
C'omt for disturbing an assembly and were fined $35.00 
(•nch. They appealed to the District Court and were con-
,·icted by jury. They were sentenced to six months in 
the Cache County Jail. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellee submits that the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent stipulates to the facts as stated in ap-
pellants' brief with the following additions. Julia Brown 
is also a negro (T.55). After she answered Mr. Chima's 
question, she asked him to sit down so she could con-
tinue answering other questions, but he would not sit 
down (T.26), and in fact began to raise his voice and 
shout at her (T.47). At that point Mr. and 1\Irs. Powell 
joined in and began yelling at Mrs. Brown, the speaker 
(T.48). Mrs. Brown then attempted to read and answer 
a written question ( T .48). She began to ask the writer 
a question, but when she realized the writer to be Mr. 
Powell, she withdrew her question (T.51). However, the 
three defendants would not sit down with the result that 
the meeting could not continue ( T .48). 
Defendants were tried and convicted in the Logan 
City Court and fined $35.00 each. On their appeal to 
the District Court they were found guilty by the jury 
and sentenced to six months in the county jail (T.160). 
However, even before sentencing the defendants, the 
District Court Judge extended leniency and clemency, 
and said that it was not the intention of the Court that 




SECTION 76-52-1, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953, DOES NOT HAVE THE OB-
JECTIONABLE QUALITY OF VAGUENESS 
AND OVERBREADTH, NOR WAS IT UN-
CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
It is elementary that in construing statutes they 
he given a presumption of validity. This rule of con-
struction also applies to state statutes falling within 
the realm of protections and prohibitions on First 
Amt>ndment freedom of speech matters. Fox v. State 
of Washington, 236 U.S. 273 at 277 (1915) affirmed the 
validity of a statute making the wilful printing of matter 
Pncouraging a breach of the peace a misdemeanor and 
in so doing the court stated, ''So far as statutes fairly 
may be construed in such a way as to avoid doubtful 
constitutional qul'stions they should be so construed: 
l'nited States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 
:3G6, 407, 408 (1908); and it is to be presumed that state 
laws will be construed in that way by the state courts." 
United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 
at 152 (1938), which is cited in appellants' brief, sub-
stantiates this point; only in a footnote does that court 
say, '' 'l'here may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation ap-
pl'ars on its face to be within a specific prohibition of 
the constitution, such as those of the first ten amend-
ments .... " However, the statute in question in the 
ease at hand does not appear on its face to be within a 
spPcific prohibition of the Constitution. 
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The statute attacked in the instant case is itself 
concerned with the protection of the First Amendment 
right of freedom of speech and assembly. Freedom of 
assembly is a fundamental right not only to be protected 
by the United States Constitution, but also by individual 
state constitutions and statutes. Section 76-52-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, is such a statute. It is specifically 
and unambiguously worded to protect freedom of as-
sembly. The interplay of ideas brought about through 
assemblies is essential to the proper functioning of our 
democratic system. "It is beyond debate that freedom 
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ''liberty assured 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which embraces freedom of speech.'' N.A.A.C.P. 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 at 460 (1958). By prohibiting 
wilful disturbances of lawful assemblies, Section 76-52-1 
of the Utah Code protects this fundamental freedom of 
assembly. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
upheld the following statute as not being so vague and 
indefinite as to make it unconstitutional: 
''No person shall address any offensive, 
derisive or annoying word to any other person 
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, 
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, 
nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence 
and hearing with intent to deride, off end or annoy 
him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful 
business or occupation." Id. at 569. 
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As this statute was held to be sufficiently narrowly 
drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct 
within the domain of state power, surely the statute 
questioned in the instant case must also be so held. 
A statute very similar to the one in question was 
held in State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E. 2d 37 
(1967) to be sufficiently definite and specific so as not 
to violate limitations imposed upon the state by the 
First Amendment. In that case the pertinent statute 
read: 
''If any person shall wilfully interrupt or 
disturb any public or private school ... either 
within or without the place where such ... school 
is held . . . he shall be guilty of a misdemea-
nor, ... " Id., at 42. 
Appellant in State v. Wiggins attempted to challenge 
the constitutionality of the statute before the United 
States Supreme Court, but a writ of certiorari was 
denied. 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). Rather than protect 
orderly conduct in schools, the statute in the instant 
case can be said to protect an interest just as funda-
mental - that of freedom of assembly. A state in the 
interest of protecting this right can impose reasonable 
restraints on the exercise of speech and conduct by 
persons who without authority of law, wilfully disturb 
or break up lawful assemblies or meetings. The State 
of Utah had the right to protect Julia Brown and the 
persons attending the assembly. The statute in question 
is desigued to afford this protection. 
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In construing statutes, words are to be given their 
plain and ordinary meaning unless the context, or the 
history of the state, requires otherwise. State v. Wig-
gins, supra. There is no word in Section 76-22-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which when given its plain and 
ordinary meaning can be said to be vague and overly 
broad. The statute reads: 
"Every person who, without authority of 
law, wilfully disturbs or breaks up an assembly 
or meeting, not unlawful in its character is guilty 
of misdemeanor.'' 
The term "wilfully", as used in the statute, is 
synonymous with "intentionally." 27 C.J.S. Disturbance 
of Public 1 p. 818. The common meaning of 
"disturb" can be found in Webster's Dictionary to mean 
"to throw into disorder." The rest of the statute is 
self-explanatory and the plain ordinary meaning of each 
word is not vague. 
The statute in question was not applied unconstitu-
tionally to the defendants. The evidence shows that Mr. 
and Mrs. Powell joined in with Mr. Chima and began 
yelling at the speaker, refusing to sit down, with the 
result that the meetillg could Hot continue (T.48). Thus, 
the evidence does show that the three of them together 
did disturb the meeting. The statute was not applied in 
an arbitrary nor discriminatory manner to the defend-
ants. The cases relied upon in appellants' brief to 
substantiate their contention of an unconstitutional 
application of the statute in qnestioll are easily distin-
guishable from the case at hand. Edwards v. South 
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Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), dealt with a situation 
where negroes peacefully assembled without any violence 
or threats of violence on their part at the site of the 
State Government and were arrested for a breach of the 
peace when they did not disburse within fifteen minutes. 
The facts of Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 
(1949) show that the guest speaker of a meeting in an 
auditorium was arrested and charged with violation of 
an ordinance forbidding any "breach of the peace." 
'rlw Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
ordinance violated the petitioner's right of free speech. 
If Julia Brown (the guest speaker in the case at hand) 
had been arrested rather than the defendants, the above 
case may have beeu applicable, and .Julia Brown's right 
to deliver her speech and conduct the assembly would be 
protected from hecklers in the auditorium. But when the 
defendants were convicted under Section 76-52-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, for disturbing Julia Brown's law-
fully conducted assembly, it cannot be said that there 
was a violation of any of their constitutional rights. On 
tho contrary, they were convicted for violating the very 
right of freedom of speech and assembly which Termi-
ni,ello v. Chicago, supra, sought to protect. 
POINT II 
UTAH STATUTORY LAW AND THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF CASE AUTHORITY 
ALLOW A DISTRICT COURT IN A CASE 
TRIED ANEW FROM A JUSTICE OF THE 
P:BJAC:BJ COURT TO INCREASE THE SEN-
7 
TENCE WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE. 
All cases cited in Points III, IV, and V of appel-
lants' brief for the authority that the District Court 
violated the due process clause, and the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States and the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy are meaningfully distinguishable from the 
instant case. Pa.tton v. State of North Carolina, 381 F.2d 
636 (1967) held that where a harsher sentence was im-
posed following a second conviction for the same offense, 
after the initial conviction had been vacated on con-
stitutional grounds, it was a denial of equal protection 
and a violation of due process not to credit the petitioner 
for time served under the sentence imposed by the first 
trial. In the present case the defendants have not served 
any of the sentence imposed by the District Court, nor 
are they likely to as the Judge extended leniency and 
clemency to them (T.160). 
Appellants cite only United States Supreme Court 
cases and federal decisions as authority for their conten-
tions in Points III, IV, and V. The long established rule 
of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) that im-
munity from double jeopardy established in federal 
decisions does not have to be applied through the Four-
teenth Amendment to the States has recently been over-
ruled in Benton v. Ma.ryland, 37 L.vV. 4623 (1969). In 
that case the defendant was first tried on the charges of 
hurglary and larceny. He was found not guilty of 
larceny, but was convicted on the burglary count. Sub-
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sequently, a Section of the Maryland State Constitution 
was struck down and as a result the defendant's case 
was remanded to be tried anew in the trial court. At this 
second trial the defendant was again charged with both 
larceny and burglary. This time he was found guilty of 
hoth charges. The Supreme Court held this a violation 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
and held it applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
However, the instant case does not fall under the 
holding of Benton v. Maryland. Rather, it falls within 
the holding of State of North Carolina v. Pearce, 37 L.W. 
4601 (1969). In that case the defendant's conviction in 
his first trial was overturned on constitutional grounds. 
\Vhen retried, he was convicted and sentenced to a prison 
term, which, when added to his time already spent in 
prison for that offense, was a longer total sentence than 
that originally imposed. The court held that the defend-
ant must be fully credited with the time already served 
for the same offense, but also held that neither the 
Double Jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection 
Clause impose a bar on the trial judge in giving a more 
severe sentence upon reconviction. The instant case falls 
squarely within the holding. The district court judge 
did have the authority to increase the sentence imposed 
hy the justice of the peace. This has long been the estab-
lished rule: 
"And at least since 1919, when Stroud v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 15, was decided, it has 
been settled that a corollary of the power to retry 
a defendant is the power, upon the defendant's 
9 
reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be 
legally authorized, whether or not it is greater 
than the sentence imposed after the first convic-
tion." 37 L.vV. 4601 at 4603. 
The fact that in the instant case the district court 
judge does havr the authority to increase the defendants' 
Hentences is also in keeping with the prevalent philosophy 
of modern penology. It is the duty of the sentencing 
judge to consider a wide ambit of factors in arriving 
at a just sentence. If he finds from these considerations 
that defendant merits a harsher sentence, it should be 
imposed, as the punishment should fit the offender and 
not merely the crime. 
Bott v. Bott, 22 Utah 2d 368, 453 P.2d 402 (1969) is 
a recent decision of this court to be noted. That case 
was a divorce proceeding where the husband was ordered 
committed to the County Jail for five days ·when found in 
contPmpt. The order was overturned by the Supreme 
Court, and the trial court, hearing the same case on the 
same mrrits, increased the sentence to fifteen days. It 
was argued on appeal that increase in punishment de-
prived the appellant of equal protection, due process, 
and violated his protection against double jeopardy. 
But the court held that the appellant's contentions re-
lating to "double jeojardy and unlawful increase in the 
sentence are without merit.'' Id., at 403. 
Defendants in the instant case appealed their action 
from the justic0 of the peace court to the district court 
under th0 authority of Sections 77-57-38, 77-57-39, and 
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77-57-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 77-57-43, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, states that in an appeal duly 
perfected from a justice of the peace court to a district 
court the action shall be tried anew. Other states have 
similar statutes, and the clear weight of case authority 
shows that in a trial de novo from a city or justice of the 
peace court the entire matter will be tried as if it were 
being tried for the first time. ''Usually on the trial de 
novo the court cannot exceed the limit of punishment 
which the magistrate could have imposed, but may with-
in that limit impose a lighter or a heavier penalty than 
was adjudged below." 16 C.J .S. § 709 ( 9), p. 385. This 
has been affirmed by numerous state decisions. The 
Supreme Court of Wyoming has held: 
''The motion to dismiss was made upon the 
theory that the court might impose a larger pen-
alty than that which had been imposed by the 
justice of the peace. The court affirmed the fear 
of counsel for defendant. But it had the right to 
impose a larger penalty.'' State v. Fra;nklin, 70 
Wyo. 306, 249 P.2d 520 at 522 (1952). 
The only state to hold that in an appeal from a city 
court to a district court the matter of sentencing shall 
not be tried anew is the State of Louisiana. The Majority 
Rule is set out explicitly by the Maryland court as fol-
lows: 
''In other states, where a statute permits an 
appeal from a magistrate to a court of superior 
jurisdiction and directs that the case should be 
heard de novo, it has been held consistently that 
the upper court hears the case as if it were being 
tried for the first time, and considers the entire 
matter of verdict, judgment and sentence as 
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though there had been no trial below." Moulden 
r. State of Maryland, 217 Md. 351, 142 A.2d 592 
at 598 (1958). 
That case cites numerous cases of other states with 
similar holdings. That case was affirmed in Hobbs v. 
State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963). 
POINT III 
A P P FJ LL AN T S WERE GRANTED 
AND HA VE NOT SERVED 
ANY SE}NTJ1JNCE; THUS, THEIR APPEAL 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS THEY HA VE 
SUFFERED NO INJURY. 
It is a fundam<>ntal premise in law that where there 
is no injury there can he no remedy. In the instant case, 
the transcript shows that even before the district court 
judgP sentenced the defendants, he granted them clem-
ency (T.160). The defendants have suffered no injury; 
they have not, nor are they going to serve any of the 
sentence imposed upon them. The weight of case author-
ity shmvs that eveu in instances where a defendant has 
accepted a suspended sentence together with probation 
or parole, he wains his right to appeal. 117 A.L.R. 929; 
State v. Miller, 225 213, 34 S.E. 2d 143 (1945); 
People, .. Boy('(:, 87 Cal. App. 2cl 828, 197 P.2d 842 (1948); 
People v. Calf is, ;144 S.App. 539, 101 N.E. 2d 739 (1951). 
The presPnt casP is even stronger for the propo-
sition that the defendants waind their right to appeal 
by accepting the clemeney granted by the trial judge. 
The present defendants have not even the possibility of 
complaining that in lieu of serving a sentence, they were 
placed on probation or parole. They have been granted 
clemency; it was the intention of the trial court judge 
that no punishment ever be actually imposed. Their 
appeal should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants' convictions in the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah should not be set aside. The 
statute under which they were convicted, Section 76-52-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is not vague or overly broad 
on its face, nor was it unconstitutionally applied to the 
defendants. Neither should the sentence of the District 
Court be set aside. Utah statutes and the weight of case 
authority show that it was within the District Court's 
power to impose a heavier sentence as long as the sen-
tl'nce did not exceed the limit of punishment which the 
justice of the peace could have imposed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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